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INSIDER TRADING WITHOUT DISCLOSURE-
THEORY OF LIABILITY
I. INTRODUCTION
Ordinarily the law will not intervene in a securities transaction;
it will allow the parties to sustain the consequences of their investment
decisions in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation. But trading by
those who have material information about a corporation which in-
formation has not been disclosed to the public constitutes a special
area of consideration in the regulation of security transactions. The
reasons for requiring disclosure have been discussed at length else-
where, and shall not be repeated here.1 This article evaluates the pro-
priety of allowing insiders to trade within that period of time during
which the law permits the corporation temporarily to withhold disclo-
sure. The interests of three parties are usually involved in these cases:
(1) the corporation whose securities are traded; (2) the one who has
the material information (the "insider"); (3) and the party with whom
the insider is trading (the "investor"). If the insider were permitted
to disclose the information which the law allows to be temporarily with-
held, the corporation might lose any advantage resulting from a busi-
ness secret, although'the party with whom the insider deals would not
seem to be injured by the transaction.2 If the insider were permitted
to trade without disclosure, there would be no direct injury to the
corporation, but the investor would have to bear any disadvantage
from his trading without knowledge. A rule prohibiting such trading
without disclosure, although possibly preventing injury to the corpora-
tion or investors, would require that the insider either forego a business
advantage, or be required to hold a losing security. No matter which
view is adopted, one party must lose. In seeking a justification for the
I See Cohen, "'Truth in Securities' Revisited," 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1340 (1966),
wherein the author reviews the present statutory framework and suggests a coordination
of all the security laws dealing with disclosure.
2 Since it already has been determined that the corporation may temporarily with-
hold disclosure for valid business purposes, the allowance of disclosure by insiders desiring
to trade would appear to be against the social policy allowing nondisclosure. Where the
disclosure is made to a limited class of investors who do not use or reveal the information
to the disadvantage of the corporation, there would appear to be no injury to any of the
parties. However, the particular investors so trading would have an advantage over
the general public trading without knowledge. Although this technique of limited dis-
closure might be advantageous to both parties in the transaction, it would be necessary
to find a base to justify the selection of particular investors over others and to evaluate
the probability of a news leak hurting the corporation. If two insiders were trading with
each other, there would be less of a chance of spreading the news, but still trading
insiders would have an advantage over the general public trading without knowledge.
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selection of one of these parties to bear the loss, the approach here
adopted first requires identification of the nature of the injury to the
investors. Next, the effect on securities marketing is examined. Finally,
having adopted a view as to the injuries resulting from inside trading
without disclosure, various legal theories purporting to explain why
the law intervenes to redress the wrongs necessarily associated with
non-disclosure are analyzed.
After the decision of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins' all federal regu-
lation of securities transactions has required a statutory base. The
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 addresses itself to the problem
of insider transactions.4 A specific provision establishes absolute li-
ability for short-swing profits by directors and officers of corporations.'
Other federal statutes affecting securities regulation deal with brokers'
and use of the mail to defraud.7 None of these cited provisions of the
Securities Exchange Acts establish a general rule against insider trad-
ing without disclosure; each is limited to cover specific situations.8
It has been asserted, however, that the combination of two federal
regulations lead to the establishment of such a general rule. Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19349 makes it unlawful to
use a deceptive device in a security sale or purchase in contravention
of a Securities and Exchange Commission rule for protection of in-
vestors. Pursuant to this enabling legislation, the SEC promulgated
rule 10(b)-51° which makes it "unlawful for any person . . . to en-
3 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
4 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1934), provides in part:
[TIransactions in securities . . . are affected with a national public interest
which makes ... necessary ... regulation and control of such transactions ...
including transactions by officers, directors, and principal security holders . ..,
in order to protect interstate commerce ... and to insure the maintenance of
fair and honest markets in such transactions ....
5 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1934).
6 Investment Advisors Act of 1940 § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1940).
7 Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1933).
8 The authoritative text on federal statutory regulation of securities transactions is
L. Loss, Securities Regulation, (2d ed. 1961).
9 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1934) declares:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national security exchange
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security ..., any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contraven-
tion of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
1o Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1948) provides in full text:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
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gage in any act... which would act as a fraud or deceit on any person
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." In interpreting
these provisions, the federal district court in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sul-
phur Co." declared: [T]rading by an insider on the basis of material
undisclosed information constitutes a deceptive practice in violation
of the statute and rule."' 2 Thus the court would impose liability if it
found that (1) the defendant was an insider, (2) the information with-
held was material, and (3) there was a purchase or sale of securities.13
Rule 10b-5 and section 10(b), however, require more than these three
elements to constitute a violation. Rule 10b-5 requires an "artifice to
defraud" or an act which would "operate as a fraud or deceit."' 4
Section 10(b) further requires such an act to be a "manipulative or
deceptive device" that violates an SEC regulation "in the public
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
11 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
12 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The logic
of the court in reaching this conclusion appears to be: (1) that which "operates as a
fraud" (rule lob-5) is a "deceptive device" (§ 10(b)); (2) by the doctrine of Strong
v. Rapide, 213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909) (a pre-Erie federal fiduciary duty case) the presence
of "special facts" create a duty of directors to disclose to stockholders before purchasing
from them; (3) "that which operates as a fraud" incorporates the "special facts" doctrine
of Strong v. Rapide; (4) trading by an insider on the basis of undisclosed inside informa-
tion constitutes "special facts." SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., supra at 278-79.
13 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 278-80 (SID.N.Y. 1966).
The court in Texas Gulf Sulphur looks to the language of rule lob-S and its judicial
interpretation in determining the meaning of each of these three elements. It would thus
appear that the court was going well beyond the "special facts" doctrine it professed to
follow, since the "special facts" doctrine was limited to (1) corporate directors or
fiduciaries, not "any person" (as in rule lob-5) ; (2) "special facts," not "material facts";
(3) and purchase by a stockholder, not purchase or sale by any person. Strong v. Rapide,
213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909). As rule 10b-5 provides its own contents in substitution for
each element of the "special facts" doctrine, there would appear to be no utility in
associating the two doctrines. Further, the "special facts" doctrine was distinguished
from the other common law doctrines of "majority rule" (holding that the corporate
directors had no duties toward individual stockholders) and the "minority rule" (finding
such a duty of directors to individual stockholders in all sales to stockholders). By giving
the title "special facts" to the duty of disclosure by the insiders to any person, the court
in fact abandons the "special facts" doctrine and goes well beyond the "minority rule."
14 Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1ob-S (1948).
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interest or for the protection of investors."'15 It is only within this
statutory framework that we may evaluate the assertion in Texas Gulf
Sulphur that there is a general prohibition against insider trading with-
out disclosure. Therefore injury to the investors whom the statute seeks
to protect must be found. This public injury is found when the market
for securities has been affected. It is also helpful to examine legal the-
ories in order to characterize behavior as deceitful or fraudulent.
II. THE INJURY TO INVESTORS
Since there is usually no injury to the corporation or the insider
by the insider trading without disclosure, imposition of liability in such
transactions would seem to be justified primarily as a protection of
investors. The concepts of "reliance," a special "relationship" of the
parties, and shifting of another's loss have been utilized in finding a
base of the injury. The "reliance" and "relationship" concepts would
appear to have less significance in the impersonal atmosphere of an
organized stock exchange. 6 Ordinarily the investor in securities will
deal only with his broker, rather than directly negotiating with the
other party. In the typical transaction the investor will either order
his broker to buy or sell at the current price on the market, or will
order his broker to complete the transaction only if the current market
price is not above or below that price which the investor has set as his
"limit."'' 7 Since the insider's offer would ordinarily be close to the mar-
ket price,' s and since it is likely the investor would have bought any-
way and received the same class of stock, it is difficult to discover an
injury. In the absence of misrepresentation or other inducements to
trade, these same considerations are relevant in negotiations not on an
organized stock exchange. Where an investor would have bought any-
way and at the same price, the failure to disclose would lead to the
same injury or absence of injury in either stock exchange or non-stock
exchange transactions. 9 Since a corporation's securities of the same
type are fungible, in the absence of an insider inducing an investor
to trade, it is difficult to see why the investor dealing with the insider
1 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1934).
I Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933).
37 G. Leffler & L. Farwell, The Stock Market 169 (3rd ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited
as Leffler-Farwell].
18 Usually the insider's offer would have little effect on the market price. Any
deviation from this price would accrue to the benefit of the investor, since to complete
the transaction the insider's offer must beat the offers of others or at least meet such
offers. Additionally, the insider would be willing to trade at a price better than that of
current market offers, since he expects a change in value to his benefit.
19 See Comment, "Civil Liabilities Under Section lob and Rule lob-5: A Suggestion
for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity," 74 Yale L.J. 658 (1965).
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is given a cause of action, while other investors who by mere chance
do not deal with the insider are not afforded a rermedy. At least the
allowance of a remedy to this particular class of investors may not be
based on a theory that this remedy is designed for his particular pro-
tection, although it may be consistent with other public policies."
Even if the insider actively sought the investor with whom he
traded without disclosure and induced the culmination of a transaction
that would ordinarily not have occurred, in the absence of misrepre-
sentation it is difficult to say the investor was injured due to reliance
on the insider. The fact that the insider action is opposite that of the
investor in the securities transaction should lead to suspicion on the
part of the investor who knows that the party with whom he is deal-
ing has access to material information. Reliance in this circumstance
would be justified only in light of a legal requirement of disclosure.
It is arguing in a circle to assert that (1) there is a duty of disclosure
because the law says there is justifiable reliance on such disclosure and
(2) there is justifiable reliance because the law says there is a duty
of disclosure. Where there is no reliance in fact, a rule requiring dis-
closure may be justified only on social policy. 1
Although ordinarily it is unlikely that an investor is injured by
reliance on disclosure, perhaps reliance on disclosure is justified in
those instances where the insider bears such a relation to the investor
as to lead to an expectancy of disclosure. Where the investor does not
know of this relationship he bears to the insider, certainly there is no
reliance, whether the transaction is on the market or private. Even
where a stockholder knows that the insider has duties to the corpora-
tion, this investor also knows that the director is functioning in a private
capacity in the transaction, and that the insider is neither an agent nor
fiduciary of the investor, but rather the opposite party in the trans-
action. Where the investor is not a stockholder in the corporation to
which the insider is associated, but rather a purchaser from the insider,
there is even less reason for an expectation of a relation leading to an
20 If the action of the insider is declared unlawful, it does not follow that the
conduct should remain unpunished merely because the particular investor dealing with
the insider is not prejudiced. Sanctions such as criminal penalties or civil liability could
be imposed. Even if there were no private loss leading to a compensatory remedy, still
the availability of a private cause of action could effectuate a policy of discouraging the
prohibited conduct, just as punative damages serve this function in the law of torts.
21 If a general rule of insider liability for nondisclosure were adopted, the rule could
act independently of any theory of reliance. Thus if "tippees" (individuals who may
have no connection to the corporation and who have gained material information through
mistake or limited disclosure) were considered insiders, they could be held liable, even
in the absence of any ground for reliance.
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assumption of disclosure. The relation of the parties here is independent
of an existing relation within the corporate organization. Reliance in
such a case would be justifiable only if the law imposed a duty of dis-
closure by insiders to all persons, which duty would be a principle of
law that was not based upon any other pre-existing fiduciary duties,
and could operate in the absence of investor knowledge of the rela-
tionship.
It has been shown that there is often no general reliance on dis-
closure and no reliance on disclosure that is founded on a special rela-
tion of the parties. Nevertheless, even without reliance there is an
economic loss. A rule prohibiting the trading by insiders with material
undisclosed information would require the insider holding a losing
security to bear the loss which is expected, or would require that the
insider forego purchase of a security which is expected to increase in
value. Without such a rule some investor would be substituted for the
insider and the injury would be shifted to this investor. Even if no way
is found to identify the particular investor who is injured, still the ag-
gregate quantity of good securities owned by investors is diminished,22
or the quantity of losing stock in the hands of investors is increased.
The imposition of a stock market system between the investors and
insiders only increases the ease of shifting the loss. The only difference
between this situation and the ordinary securities transactions is the
possession by one party of material undisclosed information. If the law
were to adopt this distinction as the basis of liability, it would no longer
be necessary to find an injury to particular investors. No longer would
there be a need for utilization of the concepts of fiduciary duty and
reliance in identifying the injury the law seeks to protect.
III. INJURY TO SECURITIES MARKET SYSTEM
The organized securities markets provide a unique example of
economic institutions which in some aspects approximate the theory of
"pure competition." 3 This is true because securities are fungible, and
the value of a security is determined by transactions between willing
buyers and willing sellers at a price largely independent of the action
22 The ability of investors and insiders under certain circumstances to buy treasury
shares does not necessarily prevent the purchase by insiders from decreasing the quantity
of good securities owned by investors. In a sale by a corporation of treasury shares, which
are about to increase in value, the corporation may be viewed as the "investor." No
aggregate gain in the ownership of good securities by investors is achieved by an exchange
between investors.
23 But as in other areas of economic activity, this free competition operates within
limits established by law. Securities regulations and antitrust law attempt to promote
this competition by eliminating "cornering" and other manipulative devices.
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of any one individual.24 The price so established reflects the relative
values the parties place on the securities sold in security transactions.
These relative values are largely determined by financial analysis and
perceptions as to the expected worth of the security at a later date,
weighed by the probability of this expectancy materializing.25 This
analysis is encouraged as a matter of economic policy, as increased
knowledge about various business enterprises will tend to allocate in-
vestment funds where they are most needed and will decrease the irra-
tionality of investment behavior. The improper valuation of securities
could lead to great financial injury to individual investors and thus the
economy as a whole in times of general price adjustments or recessions.
When the law permits a temporary period of nondisclosure a social
decision has been made limiting for a time the establishment of a price
which would reflect material aspects of a particular corporation. But
if the insider is prohibited from trading during this period, analysis
of the market will be encouraged by the prevention of trading by those
acting on inside information rather than analysis.
One function of a stock market is to encourage investment in stock
by the provision of a continuous market for securities; 2 a potential
investor may buy securities with the assurance that he may sell at any
time at a price reflecting current supply and demand. Material infor-
mation would change the supply and demand for a class of securities.27
Since social policy permits a corporation to temporarily withhold dis-
closure of material information for certain purposes, to that extent
supply and demand at a given instant does not reflect the effect of
investor analysis of the information. Allowing an insider to trade dur-
ing this period of nondisclosure would exempt the insider from the
current market supply and demand functions, while binding other
investors.28
24 Leffler-Farwell. See generally V. Due & A. Clower, Intermediate Economic
Analysis 47-48 (4th ed. 1961). Deviations from this pure model may be found in smaller
subscriptions and in block trading.
25 Other factors determining the value of an investment to a class of investors are
the propensity to assume the risk of loss and psychological considerations with respect
to the choice of investments among opportunities of the same probability of risk.
20 Leffler-Farwell.
27 "Material Information" has been defined as that which in "reasonable and
objective contemplation might affect the value of the corporation's stock and securities."
Kohler v. Kohler, 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963). Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C.
907, 911 (1961) called "material information" that which "would affect their investment
judgment." See Fleisher, "Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices," 51
Va. L. Rev. 1271, 1289 (1965).
28 Of course, a rule prohibiting the insider from trading may "freeze in" the insider.
However, this would only be for the temporary period of nondisclosure. Although the
insider might suffer an economic loss during this period, he would suffer no greater loss
than investors without the inside information.
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Since to complete the transaction the insider must sell at or below
the market, or buy at or above the market, it might appear as if the
transaction discounts the expected effect of disclosure to the benefit of
the trading parties. This price change is probably not significant as the
price would likely be near the market price in the absence of the trans-
action, since the factors creating the supply and demand functions re-
main about the same both immediately before and after the sale. Fur-
thermore, by allowing a policy of temporary nondisclosure in certain
circumstances, a policy has been indicated which would permit delay
in the effect of the information on market price.
Although there would appear to be no injury to a particular in-
vestor, since the insider's transaction does not substantially affect the
price for stock, still there would seem to be an abuse of the system, as
the fact of nondisclosure permits the insider to trade upon a more
realistic set of probabilities of gain, while at the same time it exempts
the insider from the operations of supply and demand that ordinarily
characterize stock transactions. There will be a change in the price of
securities when the extraordinary undisclosed corporate business is
revealed. This change of price is caused by the nature of the under-
lying undisclosed business. The fact of trading without disclosure only
shifts the loss, it does not cause the change of price. The investor who
loses is presumed to have anticipated the probabilities of this corpo-
rate business and assumed the risk. The fact remains, however, that
in the absence of a rule prohibiting nondisclosure the risk will be
shifted and the insider is given a preferred position enabling him to
avoid a highly probable loss or to gain an assured profit. While the in-
sider is free to trade with less uncertainty, the knowledge of a non-
insider investor that he must calculate the probabilities and sustain
his loss may tend to discourage investment.
The economic laws of supply and demand just analyzed with re-
spect to transactions on the organized securities markets also apply
in private securities transactions. The analysis is conceptually easier
to understand in terms of an organized market such as the New York
Stock Exchange, since it is more realistic in such a market to com-
prehend the immediate effect of a disclosure, the existence of innocent
investors without notice, the ease of shifting a loss, and the high
liquidity of a continuing market. To the extent a private market ap-
proximates these qualities there is a similar effect.
IV. THEoIUEs OF LIABILITY
The doctrine of fiduciary duty has often been used to explain the
imposition of liability in insider nondisclosure cases. 9 In the stock-
29 Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949).
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option transactions this doctrine would be appropriate. Where a cor-
poration is bound by a contract with its directors or officers to issue
stock to them at a percentage discount from market, it would be a
violation of such officer's duty to the corporation to exercise this option
at a time when the market had not received the material information
affecting the price. In this situation the duty of the director or officer
runs to the corporation. The ordinary rule is that the duties of the
corporate officers and directors run only to the corporation, and thus
to all stockholders, but not directly to individual stockholders." At
common law the courts split as to the rule applicable in the situation
of insiders trading without disclosure of material information to the
public; the majority of jurisdictions, including the United States under
pre-Erie common law imposed a duty only under special circum-
stances.31 Since this duty bears no relation to other corporate respon-
sibilities, and since it is an exception to the general rule of no duty
to stockholders, the doctrine is a mere fiction used to impose a legal
obligation. This fiction has been extended by applying agency prin-
ciples. Thus brokers and experts hired by the corporation have been
held to a fiduciary duty. 2 The federal securities acts nowhere speak
of fiduciary duties. They make unfair and deceptive practices in securi-
ties transactions illegal. It would be incorrect to say the goal of these
acts was to establish fiduciary duties and thus indirectly make illegal
certain conduct. Such a view would improperly interpret the statutes
as establishing a body of federal corporation law, the content of which
was left to the courts.
Three closely allied doctrines of the common law have been given
relevance by the courts in explaining the basis of liability of insiders
for trading without disclosure: agency, trade secret, and misappropria-
tion. An agency doctrine holds an agent accountable to his principals
for profits made "incidentally to his employment."33 The utility of this
doctrine is questionable in a securities transaction by a corporate offi-
cer or director, since the corporate function of such an insider would
ordinarily bear no relation to the sale or purchase of securities.
The trade secret doctrine attempts to preserve certain business
secrets which give a competive advantage to a corporation.34 Because
30 See A. Berle and G. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property
(1932), wherein the authors lament the separation of control from ownership in the
corporate system.
31 Comment, "Insider Liability under Securities Exchange Act, Rule iOb-5: The
Cady, Roberts Doctrine," 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 121, 123 (1962). The article collects the
Cspecial facts" which have led to liability.
32 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
33 M. Ferson, Principles of Agency 415 (1954).
34 4 Restatement of Torts § 757, comment (b) (1939).
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the insider releases no corporate secrets when he trades without dis-
closure, the doctrine would appear to have no application in such a
securities transaction. In addition, an element of the cause of action in
a trade secret case is a breach of confidence or other misconduct in the
obtaining or disclosure of the secret.35 To call trading without disclosure
a wrong is to avoid the necessity of using a trade secret analogy.
The misappropriation doctrine of unfair trade is used to impose
liability for the appropriation by one of the work product of another
to the prejudice of that other.36 The purpose of the doctrine is to allow
the corporation itself to reap the benefits of its efforts. The corporation
is not prevented from benefiting from its efforts by the insider's security
transaction, since the ownership of its stock is ordinarily irrelevant to
the corporate advantage derived from the underlying business event
which has not been disclosed. Another view is that "information de-
veloped within the corporate sphere belongs, of right, to all shareholders
equally."37 By selling before the disclosure an investor may lose the
expected gain in the value of a security resulting from the information.
Thus, the investor has no "right" to the gain which has been misappro-
priated.
The common law theory of misrepresentation applies only to
affirmitive declarations. In certain cases, however, an action for fraud
exists at common law for nondisclosure.3" Recent cases have declared
that actual fraud is not necessary under rule 10b-5.30 Discussion of the
significance of the doctrine of common law fraud has been lively and
needs no repetition here. There would appear to be no satisfactory
statutory base for retention of any of the elements of common law
fraud.
The appropriate theory of liability is a social determination that
35 E. I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Massland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917).
36 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). This case
was brought in the federal courts before Erie. Contra, Metropolitan Opera Ass'n. Inc. v.
Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corporation, 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1950), where
the court applied the misappropriation doctrine although the parties were not competitors.
37 Manne, "What's So Bad About Insider Trading?" 15 Challenge 14, 15 (Jan.-Feb.
1967). Professor Manne apparently does not advocate this position. On the contrary,
in an earlier article he has asserted that insider trading is a proper and necessary means
to compensate insiders and stimulate innovation within the corporate system. Manne,
"In Defense of Insider Trading," 44 Harv. Bus. Rev. 113, 116-19 (Nov.-Dec. 1966).
38 See W. Prosser, Torts § 101 (3d ed. 1964).
39 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 258 F. Supp. 262, 277-78 (1966). The court cited the
recent decisions on this question. This case should be consulted for citations to the cases
declaring various elements of common law fraud irrelevant to a rule 10b-5 cause of
action. The case further directs attention to the lively discussion of commentators on
the utility of the doctrine. Older cases asserting the need for common law fraud are
also cited.
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it is unfair to allow securities trading where the parties do not have
equal access to information. This rule applies only to material informa-
tion, and thus would not punish the insider because of his diligent
analysis, but only to prevent his shifting a certain loss in extraordinary
situations. This theory applies equally to all possessing the inside in-
formation, and considers irrelevant the relation of the insider to the
corporation. Likewise, there is no need for privity or reliance by the
investor. This rule was suggested as an alternate theory of liability in
Cady, Roberts40
Equal access to information exists only after disclosure. But in
finding whether "disclosure" is present the courts have usually adopted
technical rules which have no relevance to the determination of equal ac-
cess. For example, in Texas Gulf Sulphur the court selected the instant
of the announcement as the time of disclosure even though the informa-
tion had not yet been reported on the stock tickers or in the news-
papers.41 Certainly the complicated mining reports could not so readily
be absorbed and evaluated even if immediately reported. This theory of
equal access would be consistent with the language of the federal
securities regulations. It is a rule intended for maintenace of "fair and
honest markets," is a means of preventing "deception," and prevents
acts that would have the effect of "deception or fraud."
Barry A. Goodman
40 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
41 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 258 F. Supp. 262, 288-89 (1966).
